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Kosovo:
One Year Later
0303 GMT, 2000/3/17
Summary
Nearly
one year after NATO first intervened in Kosovo, it appears the alliance has
failed to fulfill its chief objectives, both in waging the war and keeping the
peace. Increasingly, Kosovo seems beyond the alliance’s control as crime,
weapons and drug trafficking resurface. Alliance forces are now on the
defensive against former allies within the ethnic Albanian community; the
guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) now appear to hold positions of
considerable power. Nine months after the war, the West faces a choice. It can
increase its grip on Kosovo, committing more troops and confronting the KLA, or
the alliance can resign itself to losing control of Kosovo.
Analysis
NATO’s war against Yugoslavia
set a precedent at considerable cost. It was the first instance of unilateral
NATO intervention in a sovereign nation during the alliance’s 50-year
history. NATO sent more than 1,000 aircraft to fly more than 38,000 sorties, at
an eventual estimated cost of tens of billions of dollars. The alliance deployed
38,000 peacekeepers, drawn from 28 countries, with no foreseeable end to their
mission. Reconstruction has barely begun and is expected to cost another $32
billion.
But
one year later, the alliance’s peacekeeping mission, known as KFOR, is
failing. Not only does ethnic violence persist, but the alliance appears
to be further losing control. The murder rate in the rural breakaway province
now equals that of the world’s largest cities. Sources on the ground report
that weapons are increasingly in the hands of former guerrillas. NATO troops
have come under attack by the ethnic Albanian majority as well as the Serb
minority. The alliance is steadily headed toward a daunting choice. It must
increase its grip on Kosovo or resign itself to providing a garrison force that
safeguards a tumultuous province, which is effectively in the hands of the KLA.
KFOR entered the province to
fulfill three missions: to ensure safety, enforce compliance with the June 1999
cease-fire agreements and temporarily assist the United Nations with civilian
functions, such as policing and reconstruction. But Kosovo has steadily become
an upside-down world of reversed roles. The guerrillas were supposed to disarm
and disband but have in fact maintained a strong hold on power. Increasingly,
KFOR troops are defending themselves not just against remaining pockets of
Serbs, but apparently against their wartime allies in the KLA.
It appears that elements of the
guerrillas are orchestrating violence that threatens international forces. Even
Western military officials have come grudgingly, though privately, to the
conclusion that extremist elements of the KLA are making a bid for outright
independence. NATO troops were stoned last October in the western city of Pec.
The recent violence in the northern city of Mitrovica included a grenade attack
that wounded 17 KFOR troops. In February, KFOR Cmdr. Gen. Klaus Reinhardt said,
“When NATO came into Kosovo we were only supposed to fight the Yugoslav army
if they came back uninvited. Now we’re finding we have to fight the
Albanians.”
Violent
crime is falling but the largely rural province is far from safe. In
the southeast corner of Kosovo, the American sector, there were 615 incidents of
hostile fire, 15 mortar attacks, 20 altercations with unruly crowds, 129 grenade
attacks and 58 landmine explosions – in the first six months of peacekeeping,
according to NATO figures. The murder rate for the entire province has
dropped from 127 murders per 100,000 people at the end of the war to 23 murders
per 100,000. Still, the murder rate of rural Kosovo now equals the murder rate
of Los Angeles, California – one of the world’s largest and most densely
populated cities.
Under the June cease-fire
agreement, the KLA was supposed to disband and disarm, but there is evidence
that former guerrillas now enjoy easy – even sanctioned – access to weapons.
Some 5,000 former KLA guerrillas have joined the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),
a sort of national guard for emergency and disaster response. They are allowed
to carry sidearms with the proper permit cards. But the permit cards are being
copied and distributed to other former guerrillas, according to an international
police source.
The
Power of the KLA and Drug Trafficking
In many ways, the state of
affairs in Kosovo is the result of a lack of government. The United Nations has
never had a complete plan to set up a government; nine months after peacekeeping
began there is none. In this vacuum, the KLA has flourished.
While the KLA was to have
disbanded, two important wartime figures remain at the core of the still
existent KLA power structure. Hashim Thaci, who led the KLA’s political wing
and became the chief contact for the West, is now Kosovo’s most important
ethnic Albanian politician. The commander of the KLA’s military wing, Agim
Cequ, commands 5,000 former guerrillas who are now in the Kosovo Protection
Corps.
The KLA is indebted to Balkan
drug organizations that helped funnel both cash and arms to the guerrillas
before and after the conflict. Kosovo is the heart of a heroin trafficking route
that runs from Afghanistan through Turkey and the Balkans and into Western
Europe. It now appears that the KLA must pay back the organized crime elements.
This would in turn create a surge in heroin trafficking in the coming months,
just as it did following the NATO occupation of Bosnia in the mid-1990s.
Two to six tons of heroin,
worth 12 times its weight in gold, moves through Turkey toward Eastern Europe
each month. The route connecting the
Taliban-run opium fields of Afghanistan to Western Europe’s heroin market is
worth an estimated $400 billion a year – and is dominated by the Kosovar
Albanians. This “Balkan Route” supplies 80 percent of Europe’s heroin.
For the KLA, the Balkan Route
is not only a way to ship heroin to Europe for a massive profit, but it also
acted as a conduit for weapons filtering into the war-torn Balkans. The
smugglers either trade drugs directly for weapons or buy weapons with drug
earnings in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Cyprus, Italy, Montenegro, Switzerland or
Turkey. The arsenal of weapons smuggled into Kosovo has included: anti-aircraft
missiles, assault rifles, sniper rifles, mortars, shotguns, grenade launchers,
anti-personnel mines and infrared night vision gear, according to a NATO report
cited in the Washington Times in June 1999.
There is already anecdotal
evidence that the drug trade is flourishing in Kosovo, in full view of
international authorities. The bombed out, unpaved streets of Kosovo are the new
home to sleek European sports cars with no license plates. There are 20 percent
to 25 percent more cars in Kosovo than there were before the war, according to
an international police official recently returned from several months in
Kosovo. The refugees claim Serbs took the plates, but the black Mercedes are
signs of a prospering drug trade.
Drug smuggling will make an
impact beyond the Balkans and deep into the rest of Europe. Ethnic Albanians are
the predominant smugglers in the Western European heroin market, according to
Interpol data.
Some 500,000 Kosovar Albanians
live in Western Europe. Those living off the heroin trade rely on clan loyalties
to tightly control their business partners. They gain access to Western European
cities by exploiting their reputation as refugees. This gives them a distinct
advantage over the Turks or Italians.
Although
Albanian speakers comprise about 1 percent of Europe’s 510 million residents,
they made up 14 percent of all Europeans arrested for heroin smuggling in 1997,
according to Interpol. The average quantity of heroin confiscated from arrested
smugglers was two grams; ethnic Albanians arrested for the same crime carried an
average of 120 grams, the agency said.
The U.S. government has been
– and likely continues to be – well aware of the heroin trade coming through
Kosovo, as well as the KLA connection. Just two years before the war, the
Clinton administration wanted national security waivers for 14 countries –
including Yugoslavia – in order to send arms and stem drug trafficking. The
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency reported in 1998 that ethnic Albanian organizations
in Kosovo are “second only to Turkish gangs as the predominant heroin
smugglers along the Balkan route.”
Today, Kosovo poses for NATO an
ironically similar problem to the one it posed in 1999. Kosovo’s problems –
smuggling, crime and violence – threaten to spill out into the Balkan region.
Tensions between the Serbs and ethnic Albanians challenge stability in
Montenegro and Serbia, the remaining Yugoslav republics. The alliance must not
only contain Kosovo’s problems, but prevent renewed war between the KLA and
Yugoslav forces in Serbia.
Montenegro threatens to become
the next hot spot as a result of the Kosovo war. The province’s leadership has
taken its cues from the international community’s defense of Kosovo.
Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic has announced that the West is ready to
offer help in the event of a Serb attack. Officials from the U.N. and human
rights groups have made increasingly loud requests for Western attention to
Montenegro.
NATO’s
Next Move
NATO now faces a dilemma. It
must take control of the situation in Kosovo by increasing its troop presence
and confronting its former allies in the KLA. Or the alliance can accept a role
as vassal to the guerrillas, essentially safeguarding Kosovo from a Serbian
invasion. The guerrillas, in turn, would run Kosovo as they see fit.
Withdrawing altogether from
Kosovo is out of the question; Yugoslav forces would quickly pour into the
province. The prospect of vastly increasing forces is unpleasant. As it stands
now NATO members are reluctant to deploy even enough troops to meet the current
mandate of 50,000 peacekeepers.
To maintain control, though,
the alliance must do more than increase its presence; it must reconsider its
allies in Kosovo. There are signs that the West may play a longtime moderate,
Ibrahim Rugova, against Thaci. During his recent trip to Kosovo, State
Department spokesman James Rubin met with Rugova, the first high-level public
contact between U.S. officials and Rugova since he was abandoned last year. The
prospect is stark. NATO would have to crush the KLA, risking more violence and a
public relations nightmare.
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Last Modified: 20.02.03 12:51
© Copyright: Dragan Kostadinov