NATO Aggression on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Free Web Hosting Provider - Web Hosting - E-commerce - High Speed Internet - Free Web Page

Aggression, Part 2

More weapons

On April 1st, five B-1B Lancers arrived at RAF Fairford making it the first time since WW II that any air force has fielded three heavy bombers all in same campaign. In another "historic milestone" they carried the new CBU-97 Sensor-Fused Weapon into combat.

On this photo you see MiG-29 near a road converted to serve as a take-off strip. You can also see some airfield equipment around the Fulcrum as well as a village Batajnica in the background.

On April 6th, USAF F-15E Strike Eagle dropped 5,000 lb (2268 kg) GBU-28 'bunker-buster' on a tunnel near Slatina airfield.

On April 24 RAF Harrier GR.7 dropped their first two 2,000 lb Paveway III PGM on a road bridge.

AD mobile radar are used for a very limited period of time, following which they are disengaged and relocated. I personally witnessed in operation stationary system S-125 NEVA (SA-3) on a field near Belgrade on sixtieth day of the war.

During the 78 days Yugoslav ADF fired 673 SAM's

[ as yet unconfirmed open sources suggest that VJ fired 106 man-portable, 126 unidentified, 175 SA-3 and 266 SA-6 surface-to-air missiles at NATO aircraft flying `Allied Force' missions]

With no means to acquire new military hardware Yugoslav engineers were forced to improvise and use existing stock of weapons in a new fashion. So far available details are about:

R-60 AA missile first time use as SAM missile. The missile was mounted on the chassis of a M55A3B1 towed anti-aircraft gun. Weapon pylons removed from fighter aircraft were used to launch the missile. The R-60 missile uses IR guidance and does not require a radar or any complex peripheral systems for operation.
R-73 AA missile mounted on Czech-made Praga's M53/59 mobile AAA with two 30mm cannons. The cannons were replaced by R-73

The R-60 combination had only limited successes, but the R-73 performed very well. Being best IC-missile in the world with the biggest range it became a big threat for NATO planes. It is a great pity that we didn't convert more of them!

All units showed impressing mobility and high standard of electronic silence. Military commanders skillfully managed their mobile air defense assets and used older and weather radars (at first they fired HARM only on AD radars but when F-117 was shot down they started firing at first "red lamp" of their RWR - they even fired one HARM on Bulgarian capital Sofia which is 50 km from Yugoslavias border) as decoys to distract a significant portion of NATO’s resources. In addition to these difficulties, NATO had to restrict its aircraft primarily to high-altitude missions in order to avoid innumerable mobile AAA batteries and man-portable SAMs. This made targeting of Yugoslav mobile military equipment extremely difficult.NATO had almost impossible mission to locate their targets. Stand-off surveillance proved ineffective thanks to excellent camouflage and constant relocation so UAV were only means of reliable reconnaissance. On the other hand UAV proved easy prey for AD. VJ even used M-84 machineguns, fired from Mi-8 helicopters, to destroy UAV's.

Yugoslav Air Defense, alto armed with 20 or so years old missiles and guns, forced NATO aircraft to fly above 15 000 ft (4 500m), thus preventing them from successful interdiction mission

Yugoslav forces managed to shoot down an F-117 stealth fighter (referred to as stealth because it is harder to detect with radar) (see fig. 4) and an F-16CJ on a suppression mission. In addition to the two losses, the inability of the U.S. to destroy the Yugoslav air defense network forced the U.S. to:

fly its strike missions at higher altitudes to reduce risk;
fly thousands of dedicated suppression missions, pushing its EA-6B force in Europe to its limits;
keep many low-flying aircraft, such as the Army’s Apache attack helicopters, out of combat.

YU Air Force Combat operations

Fighter-bomber units of the RV i PVO were ordered to undertake combat operations over Kosovo and Metohija Province, the targets being various positions and concentrations of Albanian rebel forces. This kind of mission was not carried out prior to the commencement to NATO air campaign, in order to avoid inviting reprisal from the western nations.

Once, the conflict got under way J-22 Orao and G-4 Super Galeb light attack fighters joined the fray. These aircraft operated from aircraft located in Central Serbia, such as Ladjevci, Obrva, Ponikve, Uzice and Nis, flying to their designated targets at extremely low level to avoid detections by NATO and USAF AWACS aircraft. In the target area pilots pulled up to a several hundred feet, quickly located the target and executed the attack. They returned to their respective deployment basses at the lowest possible altitude at high speed, with strictly observed radio silence in order to avoid detection by SIGINT aircraft flying in the area.

Because of the secrecy of these missions, orders to regiment and squadron commanders were given directly by Major-General Radoljub Masic, the Aviation Corps commander and Major-General Mile Filipovic. They were identified over the telephone and in radio communication by their voices, which were familiar to their subordinated officers. This subterfuge was successful and not a single aircraft was intercepted, even though some missions were carried out only a few miles from the areas of operations of NATO combat aircraft

Pilots who flew this missions said their radar warning receivers showed that they were illuminated by enemy radars only when they were negotiated mountain peaks.

RV i PVO's fighter-bomber force indolent lasted ten days. Further operations were halted after NATO forces attacked and damaged runway's at fighter-bombers operating basses. From that moment aircraft were kept on hidden locations to be ready for use against possible NATO ground invasion.

Reconnaissance aircraft (MiG-21R and IJ-22 Orao) played an important role in collecting intelligence about NATO and Albanian forces. There were flights deep inside the territory of neighboring countries on photo and probable SIGINT sorties. On one such sortie, Western journalist observed two IJ-22 launching flares during a low-level flight over the city of Tropoja in north of Albania.

Helicopter squadrons limited their involvement to the transportation of casualties to the hospitals and emergency deliveries of ammunition and food to forward position and garrisons. Mi-8s were used on high-risk missions for the delivery of food to border switchovers in the mountains, at altitudes of around 2000 m above sea level. To avoid detection that flew at nap-of-the-earth frequently changing speed and directions.

Transport aviation played important part in war preparations, with An-26 used extensively for deployment of reserve forces. On the first morning of the war all serviceable of the 677th Transport Squadron aircraft flew low level to Beograd and Ecka civil airport were remained to the end of the conflict. On March 26th a single An-26 carried a special mission (probably reconnaissance or intelligence gathering) between Beograd and Podgorica for which the crew was later decorated.

If you can't hit tanks...

NATO started with 365 aircraft, and after a 78 days has over 1000 but was still unable successful interdiction missions over Kosovo and Metohija to destroy ground forces.

In the first weeks NATO attacked from north, west and south but than Romania and Bulgaria allowed their airspace to be used so Yugoslavia was totally encircled with NATO "puppets" and bombed from all directions. Yugoslavia and Romania even signed a pact of "partnership" that states "no country will attack other country nor allow their soil to be used for attack on other country".

VJ managed to stay in control on the ground and to effectively destroy KLA (UCK) positions which were built under OSCE monitors supervision that prevented security forces from dealing with them. Even after numerous aerial support from NATO OVK forces trained and equipped in Albania weren't able to penetrate defense lines along the border and to advance in Yugoslavia. In May NATO started carpet bombing with either 500 lb (227 kg) Mk 82, 2000 lb (907) Mk 84 bombs or a mixture of both. The were droped from B-52's and B-1B's flying at 40 000 ft (12 192 m) alongside Yugoslavia-Albania border supporting OVK forces. Both bombers used Raytheon AN/ALE-50 fibre-optic towed repeater jammers and decoys.

During the campaign, the USAF deployed its AN/ALE-50 decoy aboard F-16 multirole combat aircraft and B-1 strategic bombers. During the campaign, as yet unconfirmed open sources suggest that the Serbs fired 106 man-portable, 126 unidentified, 175 SA-3 and 266 SA-6 surface-to-air missiles at NATO aircraft flying `Allied Force' missions. Of these, at least 125 were aimed at the five participating B-1B bombers, four of which were equipped with ALE-50. Use of the decoy is reported to have saved ALE-50 equipped B-1Bs in up to 10 engagements.

The efectivnes of AD forced NATO to scrap plans of sending AH-64 over Yugoslavia even they were loudly presented as "VJ worst nightmare". Out of 24 Apache's two crash in Albania "after technical failure".

With only limited damage on VJ units NATO started bombing of civilians target after 4 weeks of their campaign. They destroyed numerous factories, bridges and other infrastructure and industrial target.

NATO worst crime againts civilians is attacks on electrical power infrastructure. On their first attack they used BLU-114/B, a special-purpose munitions. This highly classified weapon, functions by dispensing a number of submunitions which in turn disperse large numbers of chemically treated carbon graphite filaments which short-circuit electrical power distribution equipment such as transformers and switching stations.This previously undisclosed weapon, carried by the F-117A Nighthawk stealth fighter, was used for the first time on 02 May 1999. Following these attacks lights went out over 70 per cent of the country. All hospitals, bread making facilities, water pumping stations were left without power. After first strike in took 7 hours to restore power for priorities and 20 hours for the rest of the country.

Yugoslav AF sorties during the war
Aircraft type	Combat missions		Transport missions		Other missions
Aircraft type	Flights	Hours [h.min]	Flights	Hours [h.min]	Flights	Hours [h.min]
Fighters	11	5.10	/	/	8	3.55
Fighter-bombers	25	15.25	/	/	6	3.00
Helicopters	/	/	104 [carried 113 passengers and 5 t]	59.15	75	29.55
Transport Aviation	/	/	2 [carried 113 passengers and 5 t]	2.00	17	3.40
Total	36	20.35	106	61.15	106	40.30
Total of 248 sorties were flown in duration of 122.20 hours

However, after third time we got power back only in 5 hours, so NATO changed tactics. They started, on May 21, throwing cluster bombs on transformator stations, thus destroying electrical power infrastructure. This is the "right way", by NATO, to stop "humanitarian disaster" by sending Yugoslav's to stone age without electricity and running water (water pumps run on electrical power).

Some of the worst misdeed's are:

destruction of Pristina (capital of Kosovo and Metohija) central area
destruction of entire block in city Aleksinac (18 dead civilians, 40 wounded)
bombing of passenger train near Leskovac (~40 dead, 17 missing)
bombing of Albanian refuge convoy (75 dead, 26 wounded)
destroying of a heating plant in Belgrade
bombing of "Usce" business center in Belgrade
destruction of refuge camp near Kursumlija (10 dead civilians,numerous wounded)
numeorus bombing runs on Kursumlija
destruction of refuge camp near Djakovica (5 dead civilians,21 wounded)
destroying of a tobacco plant in Nis
bombing of national TV stations headquarters in Belgrade (10 dead, 20 missing, 17 wounded)
destruction of entire block in Surdulica (16 dead civilians, numerous wounded)
bombing of inter-city bus (23 dead civilians, 40 wounded and 47 dead, 16 wounded on second occasion)
bombing of city Nis with cluster bombs in midday (14 dead, numerous wounded)
bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade(4 dead, more than 10 wounded)
bombing of Hotel "Jugoslavija" in center of Belgrade (1 guest dead)
bombing of Albanian refuge convoy in village Kosare (87 dead, ~100 wounded)- USAF F-16 responsible
bombing of "Dr Dragisa Misovic" clinical centar in Belgrade (4 dead patients, numerous patient's and medical staff wounded)
bombing of State Penitentionary in Istok (approximately 100 dead guards and prisoners, more than 200 wounde)
bombing of a news convoy (one driver dead, 2 reporters wounded)
bombing of a bridge in Varvarin in midday (11 dead, 35 wounded)
destruction of entire block in Novi Pazar (23 dead civilians, 20 wounded)
bombing of a hospital in Surdulica (19 dead patients, 40 wounded)

The following is an excerpt from "Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 2000-2001 Market Review" by Tony Cullen, Christopher F Foss; Jane's, November 2000

"The last year of the millennium was also the time when the mystique associated with the combat operation of the invulnerable Stealth aircraft was shattered. During yet another regional conflict against a pariah state and over an 11 week period in the Spring, the Yugoslavian Republic of Serbia and Montenegro together with its Kosovan enclave were subjected to the might of NATO's air power.

Despite this the Yugoslavian air defences, by what is believed to be a judicious combination of air defence systems and radars, managed on 27 March to shoot down a Lockheed Martin F-117A Nighthawk Stealth Fighter. Admittedly, although only one other aircraft, a Lockheed Martin F-16, and a moderate number of various allied Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were also lost to the air defences, a number of other aircraft were also damaged by air defence fire, including it is believed a second F-117A.

Despite this relatively low NATO attrition rate it should be recognised that despite a massive Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) campaign the use of Information Warfare tactics by the USA to infiltrate and degrade Yugoslavian battle management systems and their computers, and the introduction of the latest lethal and non-lethal air-to-ground weaponry the Yugoslavs could have rapidly reconstituted their air defence network if they so desired.

What was in fact seen by the West and conveniently forgotten in the euphoria of victory without loss and the use of air power alone was probably one of the best examples of how to protect critical resources against an enemy of overwhelming air superiority since the Vietnam War era.

The main Serbian air defence system comprised a highly professional body equipped with functional but elderly Russian-supplied (and locally modified) SAM weaponry and radars, modern computer networking and communications, considerable built-in system redundancy and using tactics which were originally taught under the former Yugoslavian Communist regime but were designed to defend against both Eastern and Western threats.

The Yugoslav army also had in its own right considerable low-level air defences deployed in the Kosovo area. These were of sufficient strength and organisation to force NATO aircraft to operate at medium altitudes for much of the campaign. Thus causing considerable problems to NATO in its target identification, acquisition and weapon launching situations.

The low-level systems deployed included considerable numbers of Igla (man-portable SA-18 `Grouse'), Igla-1 (man-portable SA-16 `Gimlet'), Strela-1M (self-propelled SA-9 `Gaskin'), Strela-2M (man-portable SA-7b `Grail'), Strela-2M/A (locally built and modified man-portable SA-7b `Grail'), Strela-3 (man-portable SA-14 `Gremlin'), Strela-10 (self-propelled SA-13 `Gopher'), BOV-3 (self-propelled triple 20 mm), ZSU-57-2 (self-propelled twin 57 mm) and M53/59 (self-propelled twin 30 mm), backed up by mobile batteries of 2K12 Kub (self-propelled SA-6 `Gainful') and 9K33 Osa (self-propelled SA-8 `Gecko') SAMs.

Probably one of the most enduring pictures of the Kosovo air campaign for the editors was at the end, when after weeks of continual bombing and daily NATO claims of the air defence network destruction, the Yugoslav army was seen to roll out of Kosovo across the border into Serbia with long lines of intact air defence vehicles."

NATO statistics show that a total of 38,004 sorties were flown between 24 March and 10 June, an average sortie-generation rate of 494 missions per day. Of the total, 14,006 were strike and suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) missions (10,808 of which were dedicated strike sorties). In the early days of the campaign, however, the sortie rate over Yugoslavia was more like 150 missions per day.
NATO restricted the operating height of attack aircraft to a baseline of 15,000ft for much of the war.
NATO released 23,614 pieces of air munition
35% of weapons released was guided
329 cruise missiles (BGM-109 T-LAM and AGM-86C CALCM ) were fired

US Navy Admiral James Ellis, the commander-in-chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe warned after the war that, "After 78 days of hard campaigning, we effected little degradation on a modern IADS system."

Yugoslav Third Army (responsible for south-east part of FRY incuding Kosovo and Metohija) losses:

161 killed in combat

299 wounded

13 T-55 tanks destroyed ( 7 by NATO, 6 by KLA)

6 APC

8 artilery pieces

19 AA guns

Air force losses:

3 An-2TD

1 An-26

19 Galeb G-2

~ 10 SuperGaleb G-4

1 J-22 Orao

11 Mig-29

number of YU Aviation Museum aircraft (3 Mi-14, 2 Ka-25, 1 Mig-21U)

According to a report presented to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) the Yugoslav Air Force lost a total of 50 aircraft

In conclusion

Yugoslav armed forces performed well above all expectations - VJ managed to control the territory and to defeat OVK in spite of fierce NATO bombings.
NATO fulfiled its objective, practically without casualties, deploying KFOR forces in Kosovo and Metohija province. VJ and Police forces pulled out, after the Military Technical agreement signed in Kumanovo, when it was recognized by the Yugoslav government that without allies and massive military aid the NATO could not be defatted.
NATO grossly underestimated VJ at the beginning of their operation - at the end they needed ~80 days (they planed 4-5 days), ~1060 aircraft (they started with 365) flying from 7 counties to bring mater to satisfying solution
Even older weapon systems (from seventies and eighties) with innovative tactics may be used successfully on modern battelfield.
Dispersed and well camouflaged troops can stay undetected even for the technically most advanced adversary.
B-2/JDAM and AWACS/AMRAAM combinations performed as advertised.
USAF proved that "smart" weapons could minimize civilian casualties if they wish to do so. Unfortunately when they needed to fly low to hit "pin-point" targets pilots, in fear of heat-seeking missiles, stayed above 4000 m and killed many innocent people (UK rushed in operation modified BL755 that could be launched from medium altitude).
NATO finally suppress VJ medium range SAM's (from seventies) but they had very little success in destroying low-level systems and were forced to commit large numbers of SEAD aircraft at every mission.
Real-time targeting is still not good enough to provide sufficient targeting and battle-damage assessment information
NATO intelligence services performance was notoriously bad - they provided maps to bomb Chinese Embassy (if that's really happened), they totally miscalculated situation in Yugoslavia, Information war was a big disappointment (leaflets, TV and Radio programs "we bomb you for your own good" are pathetic).
NATO proved very effective in disrupting civilian lives and in destroying infrastructure targets.

The NATO briefings did not lie, but they were massive exercises in spin control, carefully tailored facts, and carefully chosen omissions.

Since KFOR troops were deployed in Kosovo and Metohija around 250000 non-Albanians were forced to leave their homes and more than 800 were killed

The newest version of this page has large except from the article by Aleksandar Radic and Vladimir Jovanovic, published in Air Forces Monthly April 2002 issue

Last Modified: 20.02.03 12:52